Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Local Realty Company, a corporation v. V.A.
Lindquist and Mary Lindquist, his wife : Reply
Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephens, Brayton & Lowe, and Calvin Behle; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Local Realty Company, a corporation v. V.A. Lindquist and Mary Lindquist, his wife, No. 6004.00 (Utah Supreme
Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/28

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

TAH
CIJMENT

FU

.9

UTAH SUPR::ME COURT
BRIEF

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
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LOCAL Rl~.~T/l'Y COl\lPA~Y.
a <·orporahon,
Plai'Jdiff and Appellant,
YS.

\T. A. LINDQUIST and MARY

·

Xo. G004

)

LINDQFTS1', his wife,
!Jdl'nrlants
and Respomleuts. I
.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
rl'he brief of the rcspondentR in thiR appeal under
Heading IT citcR hYo Utah eases whi<'h arc elaimed to
support the eontention of respondents. These are :McLanp;h1in vs. Park City B:mk, G:~ P. GK~J: 2:2 Ut. 4/i) (1900),
and Carlquist vs. 'Coltharp, 248 P. 481 ; (i/ 1TL 514 (1926).
In onr opening brief we said at pag·e 1:) that there
are no Utah cases on the point involved, and that it
would sc1Te no purpose to eitc or diseusR authorities inYohing points whieh are not involved in this particular
C'asc. Thus no mention is made whatsoever of these
i \\'O cnses which are novv relied upon by respondentR.
A ppellani resperifully snggestR that the ('onrt mnRt de-

termine ~whether these eases are or arc not in point.
this connection, however, we may observe:

Iu

The McLaughlin case in brief involves tho rlaim of
an attaching creditor of real property as against tho
general receiver of the mortgagor, to proceeds of a fire
insurance policy which were paid because of a fire which
occurod subsequent to tho attachment, lmt prior to auy
sale under execution. rrhe insurance poliry had been
taken out by the receiver and he had paid the premiums:
he had also remained in possession. It seems sound
enough under the circumstanres that the court hold:
1. "The real estate in controversy was rightfully
held 'by tho receiver with the right to the usc, rents and
profits thereof for tho benefit of the estate until Cupit
(attaching l'reditor) shouhl acquire title by a sillo 011 hi,;
execution.''
2. ~he receiver had au insurable interest in tho
property; also tho right to usc it, receive reub; from it,
repair it and preserve it from l'oss the same as auy other
owner would have.
::3. That as between tho aitaching creditor who at
the time of the fire had not yet bought in tho property
at execution sale, let alone o'btaiued uncouditional title
by expiration of the period of redemption without a
redemption, the receiver was entitled to the proceeds of
the insurance.
This case is brief and it is obvious in reading tho
opinion that 8edion 104-:~7-:~7 aR it then oxiRted, wa"

neither involved nor discussed in any way. It is in no
sense authority either for or against. the Issues now
before .the court in this case.

1n the Carlquist case a receiver pendente lite was
appointecl after the mortgagee eommenced his forec·losure action. Subsequent to the execution of the mortgage and prior to the commencement of the foreclosure
adion the mortgagor executed a crop mortgage covering
crops which were growing at the time the foreclosure
ad ion was commenced. The mort age did not contain any
provision giving the mortgagee the right to possession or
a lien upon the crops. The receiver harvested the crops
and solcl them; then he turned tlJe proccecls into court
and was discharged-all this before the elate set for the
trial of the foreclosure proceeding, and t lms of <·om·se
before the sale or the period for redPmption had expirNL
The ease inYolved the eonf-licting claims of the mortgagee
and the crop mortgagee to the proc·ecds, .m<l the court
held that under the circumstances the crop uwrtgagec
prevailed. This was the sole question presented on the
appeal; the cross appeal involved subjects iu 110 possible
way pertinent to our ease. The court said: '' rrhe mortgagor has, therefore, the legal title, nnrl is t>ntith·rl to
retain possession of the premises uniil the expiration
of the time for redemption, unless the terms of the mortgage give the mortgagee the right of possession." The
case now before this court does not involve the question
of the right of possession which is conceded; nor is the
striet qnestion of title involved.

There is thus nothing in the two foregoing eases
which has any bearing whatsoever on our point, and m
so far as these decisions are concerned they seem to
be sound and eonsistent with plaintiff's conteution m
this partic11lar case.
The other matters urged in respondents' brief are
fully covered in the opening brief of appellant and furtlher discussion with respect thereto would serve no nsefnl purpose. Section 104-:37-37 as a matter of substantive law by its plain language vests in the purc·haser at
the sale the right not only to the rents of the property
sold, bnt also to ''the value of the use and occupation
thereof," despite any attempt by respondent to restrict
the statute in its operation to "rents", and to ignore and
disregard the part above quoted. The cases of Harris
V·S. Reynolds and \Yalker vs. l\fcCnsker in California,
Clifford & Company \'S. Henry in North Dakota, and
Citi~~;ens National Bank vs. \V estern Loan & Building
Company in Montana, all .of which are fully discussed
in appellant's brief, hold that the mortgagor-exerution
debtor is a "tenant in possession" under this statute,
and sub;ject to its terms.
Respectfully sn bmi ttecl,
STEP! IF,NS, BRAYTON & l ,0\\"K

and CALVIN
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